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Recal! that ina steady state the actualand the expectedrates of inflationare equal. We ignoregovernment gains (losses)at the point in time therate of monetary growthis changed.















ADROALDO MOURA DA SILVA
Universidade de So Paulo
The Basisof the Minidevaluation Policy
LII INTRODUCTION
Brazil's exchange policy follows, ingeneral terms, the purchasing power
parity theory, which, in turn,had its inspiration in the teachings of the
quantity theory of money. The centralidea derives from the classical tenet
of homogeneity: in the long run, anincrease in all nominal prices does
not cause any alteration in thereal variables (relative prices, quantities
produced and consumed) of the economic system.
The application of this principle to the caseof an economy geared
toward foreign countries can be understood in thefollosving manner. In the
first place, it is important to understand thatwhat counts for the purposes
of the balance on current account is the relationbetween the prices of
domestic goods (thatis, of the goods and serviceswhich do not enter
directly into the flows of trade with the rest of theworld, from the price of a
haircut to the remuneration of labor), on the onehand, and the prices of
international goods (importable and exportable goods), onthe other. in the
second place, it is known that the prices in national currencyfor interna-
tional goods (given the prices in foreign currencyand the prevailing
commercial policy) basically depend on the exchange rate,which in turn is
controlled by the monetary authorities.
Thus, given the exchange rate, domestic inflation (thepersistent increase
of all prices and of the cost of domestic goods) causes achange in the
relative prices between domestic and international goods insuch a way as




102 Adroaklo MouraDa Sik
cwze:ros) ot the exportable goods, while the export earniilgs ot the
same
monetary unit remain constant (given the exchange rate and thePlftes in
foreign currencies); and (2) encourage imports, as tile Costs andprices of
the goods that conipete with the imports grow while the ()St Ut
inlport&ltjo.l
reniains constant. This process eatises dehcits in the balanceof current
transactions, even if the country's terms of trade (in foreigncurrency)
remain constant.
Under these conditions, the only way to neutralize the harmful
effects of
domestic inflation on the balance on current account is todevah,je national
currency in relation to foreign currency, thus avoiding changes
jth
relative price between domestic and internationalgoods. It is at thispoint
that the classical tenet of homogeneitycomes into the Picture: if allprices
in cruzeiros, including that of the foreigncurrency, increase at thesame
rate, in the long run no change in the real variables of theeconomic system
can be expected.
The concept of exchange devaluation capableof producing thisneu- trality is given by
=-
where
= the rate of exchange devaluation
the rate of domestic inflation
= the rate of external inflation
This assumesconstancy in (1) the terms oftrade and (2) in theequilibrium level of the exchangerate.
Itshould be observed that,since the price changesare practically continuous in time, the policymust be conducted in sucha manner as to avoid cumulative deficitsduring the intervals betweenexchange dev2lua- tions, i.e., the exchangemust be devalued frequentlyand, therefore, at low rates.
It is obvious that theimplementation of this criterionof economic policy requires certainprecautions if seriouserrors in interpretationare to be avoided Some of theseproblems will be discussednext.
till THE REALEXCHANGE RATE INBRAZIL: 1968-1973
Considering the resultobtained regarding thereal exchange rate (in rela- tion to the U.S. dollar),Brazilian exchangepolicy has very nearly followed the criteriondiscussed in theprevious sectionIf we take asa basis the103
Minidevau1tbduiPolicy
nominat exchangerateof the thirdquarterof 1968the policy of
110devaIUati0n wasinitiated in August of that yearit will be seen that
the valueof the dollar in terms of cruzeirosincreased in such a way as to
keep thereal level of 1968 relatively constant.
Table 1 showSnominal exchange rates, and Table 2, real exchange rates,
As can be seenin Table 2, the exchange rate was maintained in real terms
between 3.62in the third quarter of1968the highest of the period
l9681973a3.24 in the fourth quarter of 1969the lowest levelof
the wholeperiod. As of 1970, however, a clear trend emerges torevalue
the cruzeiroiiireal terms. For example, the real rate was l)ersistentlY
maintained below the valuesfor 1968 and 1969. In fact, if we compare the
values of thereal exchange of 1972 and 1973with that of1 968, an
overvaluatton of the cruzeiroin relation to the U.S. dollar on the order of 7
to 8 percent canbe observed. Before askingourselves about the effects of
this revaluation, wemust take into consideration someadditional informa
lion.
It is evident thatfor the purpose of exchangepolicy the U.S. dollar is not
the only relevantnational currency. Due to the frequentexchange crises of
the last few years,especially from 197 1 onarid withthe consequent
devaluation of the U.S.dollarparticularly in relation to the German
rk_commentmg on overvaluation orundervaluation of the cruzeiro is a
complex task. InasmucIi as there was an overvaluatioiiof the cruzeiro in
relationto the dollar, our currencywas substantiallyundervalued in
relation to the Germanmark, the Swiss franc, the Frenchfranc, the yen, the
currencies of the Netherlands, andother European currencies. Inrelation to
the mark, the undervaluationreaches significant figures: 20percent and 30
percent, respectively, in1972 and 1973 comparedwith 1970.
If,in addition, we considerthe fact that the WesternEuropean and
Japanese markets already absorb agreater fraction of ourexports than does
the U.S. market, theunavoidable conclusion is that, atleast in respect to
the composition of our foreignmarkets, our exchangepolicy was not
neutral. The overvaluation of thedollar in conjunctionwith the undervalu-
ation of the currencies of Europeand Japan point in thedirection of an
orientation to (1) decrease the incentivestor placing Brazilianproducts in
the U.S. market and increase theconipetitivefless ofAmerican products in
our market; and (2)increase the incentivesfor selling to Japaneseand
Western European markets afl(l decreasethem br purchasingfrom these
markets.
This is the actual trend observedduring the period]and markedly so
during the year 1973; the share ofthe U.S. market,which absorbed an
average of 27 percent of ourexports during1968-1972 (23 percentin
1972, the lowest figure of theperiod), decreased in1973, when itdid not





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6(08 Adroaklo Moura RiSilva
Brazil's pro(lucts, especially in 1 973,were those whose nat ionalcurrejlc\, wac most undervalued versus thecruzero (VIS-à-ViS which we devalued
niore pronouncedly), i.e., the Dutch, the Japanese,and the German.
And it is here that we note the first disturbingelenient in the neutralityof
our exchange Policy: the dance of the nationalcurrency values. In the
aggregateor, the basis of an index of the real exchangevalue oth cruzeiro inrelation to the nationalcurrencies of our principaltrade partners, that takes into account their relativeparticipation in ourexports during the period 1968-1973(see footnote, Table 3), wecan verily as
shown in Table 3, that thecruzeiro remained quite stable between1968 and 1972, and then underwenta real devaluation in 1973 ofsome io
percent (compared with 1968).
It should he noted that 1973was a particularly difficult year withregard to interpreting the values assignedto national currencies. Not only didthey continue to fluctuate, but,niore fundamentally, therewas a Profound change in relativeprices in favor of basic products ingeneral, which
culminated in the increase ofthe petroleumPrice in October of that year.
This leads us to the problemgenerated by changes ina country's terms of trade.
[liIi MINIDEVALUATION,TERMS OF TRADE, ANDEQUILIBRIUM IN THE TRADE BALANCE






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5prevent disequilibriumin the trade balance from spreadingout into in-
flationary pressures inthe case ot improvement, or into deflationary
pressures on theproduct and employment levels in the case of deteriora-
tion in the termsof trade. In the latter case, the exchange policy in effect
simply sanctions a change in the terms of trade, thus avoiding a more
"painful" adjustment process in the classical mold of the gold standard.
This simple consideration inevitably leads to the following questions: Was
the level of exchange in August 1968 (the beginn!ng of minidevaluatjon
policy) one of equilibrium? Was the exchange rate of 3.63 cruzeiros per
dollar at that time consistent with the constellation of relative prices (prices
of domestic and international goods, on the one hand, and the terms of
trade, on the other) and therefore with equilibrium in the trade balance (in
view of the country's trade policy)?
Unfortunately, this is the type of problem for which there is no definite
answer. However, judging by the behavior of the country's trade balance
from 1968 to1 970, which showed a surplus throughout the period (26,
318, and 231 million dollars in 1968, 1969, and 1970, respectively), we
can conclude with some assurance that the exchange rate of 3.63 was one
of relative equilibrium at the time. Itis obvious that these surpluses and
even the extraordinary performance of exports during that period cannot be
credited solely to the exchange policy. The system of export incentives
(actually an indirect means of increasing the rate of exchange for exporters
of manufactures) and the improvement in the terms of trade are important
factors in the explanation of the phenomenon.
It is also clear that simply to maintain the real exchange rate for 1968 is
not enough to guarantee continuing equilibrium in the trade balance for
subsequent years. Changes in the ternis of tradelike those inBrazil
during the last few years, can cause serious imbalances in international
trading.In any event, thisis the message thatis conveyed: A healthy
exchange policy not only requires that the untavorable impact of the
domestic inflation on the trade balance be neutralized (the very reason for
the existence of the Brazilian system of minidevaluation), but alsoand
more fundamentallythat the level of equilibrium of the ratebe identified,
which in turn, among other factors, is directly connected with tile fluctua-
tionsin the country's terms of trade. This distinctionisallthe more
important the more sudden and lasting tile changes in trade relations are,
and, therefore, the greater the disequilibrium in international markets.
In this respect, the years 1973 and 1974 are very illustrative. The 1973
picture can be briefly characterized thus:
1.On the one hand, we can observe an extraordinar' increase inthe
dollar prices of our main export products. In fact,judging by the
available statistics, the index of the terms of trade records astrong
S
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gain for the year. (It should lx noted that, although the petroleum
price increase started in October, its effects were only felt in 1974)
2.On the other hand, the economy was in a phase of high activity, of
easy liquidity--caused primarily by a massive inflow of financial
resources from abroadwith high levels of aggregate expenditures
and therefore strong inflationary pressure.
In view of this picture alone, the real exchange equilibriumwould
certainly not he the one of the real 1968 level. In order to adjust to thenew
level of equilibrium, either (1) a higher level of domestic inflation thanthat
set as a goal by the authorities should be permitted; or, alternatively, (2) the
exchange rate should be relatively revalued.
The path which was actually followed in generalwas as follows. On the
one hand, a small revaluation (in February of 1973) of the cruzeiro in
relation to the U.S. dollar was opted for;it was followed by a cautious
policy of minidevaluation, so thatdespite the four devaluationsof that
yearthe nominal exchange rate at the end of 1973was exactly the same
as the one observed in December 1972. On the other hand, a policy of
quantitative control was also adopted for export products whoseprices had
been speculatively increased in the internationalmarket, such as soybeans
and its by-products.
Still, in spite of the great expansion of themeans of payment, the records
of the trade balance showa surplus on the order of 200 million dollars
compared with 1972 (when a deficit ofsome 200 million dollars was
recorded). It is clear that in view of sucha picture, these economic policy
measures could have been accompanied bya greater control of the
aggregate expenditure through the instruments ofmonetary and fiscal
policy. (In truth,it should be added that during the wholeperiod the
country's monetary policy was conditioned bya massive inflow of foreign
exchange.)
In any event, the 1 973 exampleseems to show that exchange policy can
and must be manipulated not onlyin regard to the difference between
domestic and foreign inflation, butalso in relation to changes in the real
phenomena which affect the balanceof current transactions.
What about the year 1974? Herethe picture changes radically. On the
one hand, we have a simply frightful figure:a 2.5 billion dollar deficit
for the first halt of theyear alone--in our trade balance. Ifwe add to this
amount the deficit on current account,we will reach a figure greater than
the total export value during thesame period (a 3.7 billion dollar deficit
against 3.1 billion exported, figures publishedin the Conjuntijra of August
1974). Judging by the officialestimates, it can be surmised that thepicture
for the second half of theyear alone is no more encouraging:a trade deficit
on the order of 5 billion dollars. It isa fact that the increase in the price of
112 Adroaldo Moura Ba Sikaoil is greatlyresponsible for this imbalance. But the problem is not only oil.
The drop inrelative, if not absolute, prices and in the exports of our main
products__excePt cocoa and sugar (the drop illtold! value exported, in
terms ofbasic products, was about 125 million dollars in the first half of
the year), aswell as sharp increases n the importation of machinery and
equipment and products otherthan oil (possibly for speculative accumula-
tion of stocks)help explain the phenomenon. In SUfl1, everything indicates
that there was asubstantial deterioration in the country's terms of trade.
(According to the speech of the Minister of Finance published in the
newspaper 0 Estadode São Paulo of November 30, 1974, the average
price in dollars of ourimports increased by 53 percent between January
and September of 1974).
On the other hand, a policyof rigid control of liquidity was started as of
the second quarter.in conjunction with an attemptproved of short
durationto ease pricecontrols. This culminated in a reduction of real
liquidity, accompanied by high monthly inflation rates. The drop in real
liquidity and the "sanitization"of the capital market (tuse an expression
of the present Minister of Finance), on the onehand, stemmed the rise in
the general price index during the third quarter and, onthe other, caused a
retraction of aggregate expenditure, thus breaking up therhythm of eco-
nomic activity. This, in turn, has caused fears of recessionand a drop in
employment.
Under these conditions,adjustmentinthe trade balance willbe
achieved either through a domestic depression, with a failing off ingrowth
rates of product and employment and/or of prices, oralternatively, through
an exchange devaluation. In any event, tomaintain the policy of devalua-
tion solely through the difference between domesticand external inflation
is to accept the first adjustment mechanism, that is, toallow equilibrium to
restoreitself automatically through the drop in thelevel of economic
activity within the framework of the classicalmechanism of the gold
standard.In fact, we are faced with a classicalproblem of political
economy: a drop in product growth and a severedeficit in the balance on
current account.
In such a situation, insofar as it is desirable to maintainbusiness activity
and employment at a high level, we should follow anexpansionist mone-
tary and fiscal policy combined with a fairlysubstantial exchange devalua-
tion in o'der to attain a balance on both the internaland the external fronts.
Unfortunately, this does not seem to have been thepath followed by the
monetary authorities. Froni the standpoint ofaggregate expenditure,both
monetary and fiscal policies have beencontraction-oriented. According to
official sources, at the same time that the (nominal) exijansionrate of the
means of payment was below the inflation rate,the records of the Treasury
indicate a cash surplus of about 4 billion cruzeirosfor the year 1974. If this
































trend prevails, it will he very difficult
around 6-7 percent in1 975. And
instruments of economic policy are
prevent such a situation, the results
to ma iota in an arlrl lid! growthratf
itcan be dearly seen thatifth
not VigorOusly l(tiVdte(J JO Orderto
could be even consideral)l
IIVJ THE OPTIONS OF ECONOMICPOlICY
Should an expansionist fiscal and monetary policy be pursued, an evaltia.
tion of foreign ec000nlic policy alternatives must consider the Iollowi
alternatives as well:
Import Substitution
In view of the country's imports agenda, a substitution policy wiU inevjta.
bly concentrate on the areas of machinery and equipment and of basic
imports.It would seem thatthe greatest problem liesin the area of
machinery and equipment: which types, and at what pace, couldwe
substitute without impairing the future efficiency of the industry,itself
geared toward exportation? Past experience seems to indicate that this task
will be difficult to accomplish and can only be successful over the longer
range. Even in the area of basic resources (for example, the l)etroleunl of
Campos) the solution will necessarily be one of medium range. Unless itis
acceptable to lose reserves or to increase the external debt, that is,to tr' to
gain time, the effort of import substitutionis an inefficient means of
eliminating, at short range, the fundamental disequilibrium in the balanceof
current transactions.
Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers
Although these instruments are efficient with respectto import control, they
are quite inefficient from the standpoint of allocation, that is, theycan
seriously impair the effort to improve the competitiveposition of the export
sectornot to mention the possibility of retaliationon the part of our
commercial partners. With regard to exports, the shoecase shows that the
existing incentives alreadyappear excessive from the viewpoint of the
international community. In any event, the tariffinstrument can, in the short
run, inhibit importation and that is what is actually being doneby the
government.
Itis obvious that no instrumentcompares favorably with an efficient
exchange rate policy. For the shortterm, devaluation is an efficient means of
eliminating the deficit incurrent transactions;itinhibits imports while
providing new incentives forexports without creating any problems of a
political nature on theinternational scene. Further, itcompares favorably ssithjinideV33ti0fl Pelic
othermethods by not beingdiscrimi flatOrv \%itl respect to import and export
pians andis theretore moreelt;cient trom an allocation 5 iesvpoi nt.
ihs preferenCe Innoa\ implies that an abrupt ehange des aluation
being advocatedIt ss ould suttice that the des 1lujtR)ri5 be tai ned out at
short intervalsin such a mariner as to ovenome theditterence betss een
domestic and foreignintlation icr a certain ti me period. thus pla. ing the
xChaflge at alevel more consistent ss iththe equilibrium ot the trjde
balance,which should be mai ntai nod cinderthe already consolidated
minidevaivahbon pohcv.This in no ss as compromises that policy; it onl
strengtheitnsotar as it avoids persistent and curnulatis e deficits in the
balance ot currenttransactions.
While thisset of policynstruments---o\parlsion 01 liuiditv and ot
government expenditurescombined with exchange devaluation--helps to
minimize the retreatin the pace 01' economic activity and maintain a
relative ease in thebalance 01UIiF1t transactions,it also causes some
undesirable effects Acceleratingthe process o e\changc' des aluation will
certainly exert some upss and pressure onthe general price index. In tact,
this appears unas oidable.As ss e base seenit one ss isheto avoid larger
devaluations the equilibrium 01the trade balance demands slower growth
in production andorprices. ibis can lead to the follossing situation:As
prices and the inflation rateshoss a certain doss nsvarcl intlexibulits ,the
adjustment process usually operatesthrough drops in the output rate,
sshich, in turn, can lead to a more expansionistmonetary and fiscal polic
in the process of salvaging theemployment level. This. again, generates
strong inflationary pressuresand stilllarger deficitsin the balance on
current account. Thus, avoidanceof sharper exchange devaluationsin
correcting an external nialacljustment canresult in the disquieting situatron
of higher inflation rates and a larger tradedeficit, the worst of both ss orlds.
In addition, the question of the externaldebt in cruzeiros arises. Asthe
private sectoris already emerging from aliquidity crisis, and not un-
scathed, it would be very difficult br the system as awhole to survive a
more rapid devaluation (greaterthan that which is alreaclanticipated)
without a new crisis,this time generated bythe necessity oflarger
reimbursements in cruzeiros to i' forthe commitments inforeign
currencies. In fact, the problem here couldonly be by-passed ifsimulta-
neously with the exchange devaluation one or aset ot the loltoss ing
measures would be taken:(1Decre.clsing irlCOflle tax onremittances
abroad, which has already been implementedarid t21 creating aspecial
fund through which the government would directly
subsidize interest and
amortization payments by means of a''financial exchange rate"which
would be lower than the commercial onesomething similar to a"back-
ward withholding rate").